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I
N HIS SPEECH TO THE 113TH MINISTERIAL SESSION HELD
from November 5-6, 2003, in Chisinau, the capital of Moldova,
the President of the European Court of Human Rights (Court),
Luzius Wildhaber, stated that “the 38,000 applications which we
expect to be lodged in 2004, the 46,000 or more that we anticipate in
2005, are indeed of concern.” What worried him even more was the
accumulating backlog of substantial cases that cannot be dismissed as
manifestly inadmissible, cases which raise a substantial issue under the
Convention, are communicated to the respondent government, and
thus give rise to an adversarial procedure culminating in a fully rea-
soned decision or judgment. 
This alarming concern in 2003 about the functioning of the
European system of protecting human rights is not new. The same
concern gave rise to the reform of the supervisory mechanism
enshrined in Protocol No.11 of 1998 to the European Convention on
Human Rights (Convention). In fact, more than a decade ago, it was
already quite obvious that the European system would come under
extreme pressure.
BACKGROUND
UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (in
its original version), complaints could be brought against contracting
states either by other contracting states or by individual applicants
(individuals, groups of individuals or non-governmental organiza-
tions). Recognition of the right of individual application was, howev-
er, optional and it could therefore be exercised only against those states
which had accepted it. 
The complaints were first the subject of a preliminary examina-
tion by the European Commission of Human Rights, which deter-
mined their admissibility. Where an application was declared admissi-
ble, the Commission placed itself at the parties’ disposal with a view
to brokering a friendly settlement. If no settlement was forthcoming,
it drew up a report establishing the facts and expressing an opinion on
the merits of the case. The report was transmitted to the Committee
of Ministers of the Council of Europe.
Where the respondent State had accepted the compulsory juris-
diction of the Court, the Commission and/or any contracting state
concerned had a period of three months following the transmission of
the report to the Committee of Ministers within which to bring the
case before the Court for a final, binding adjudication. Individuals
were not entitled to bring their cases before the Court.
If a case was not referred to the Court, the Committee of
Ministers decided whether there had been a violation of the
Convention and, if appropriate, awarded “just satisfaction” to the vic-
tim. The Committee of Ministers also had responsibility for supervis-
ing the execution of the Court’s judgments.
The increasing case-load prompted a lengthy debate on the
necessity for a reform of the Convention supervisory machinery,
resulting in the adoption of Protocol No. 11 to the Convention. The
aim was to simplify the structure, with a view to shortening the length
of proceedings, while strengthening the judicial character of the sys-
tem by making it fully compulsory and abolishing the Committee of
Ministers’ adjudicative role.
Under Protocol No. 11 to the Convention the existing, part-time
Court and Commission were replaced by a single, full-time Court.
The acceptance of individual petition and the acceptance of the
Court’s jurisdiction became compulsory. With respect to individual
petitions the Committee of Ministers did not play a role any longer.
Responsibility for supervising the execution of judgments lies with the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. The Committee of
Ministers verifies whether states, in which a violation of the
Convention is found, have taken adequate remedial measures to com-
ply with the specific or general obligations arising out of the Court’s
judgments.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO PROTOCOL 11 
OF THE CONVENTION
THE EVENTS OF 1989 AND 1990 IN EASTERN EUROPE following
the dramatic fall of the former Soviet Union brought with them a vast
change in the Council of Europe, in that there was a rapid increase in
the number of its member states. In its approach to enlargement, the
Council of Europe decided that ratification of the Convention short-
ly after joining the organization should be a condition for accession.
Consequently, the Convention, to which twenty-two states had previ-
ously been party, was ratified in or after 1990 by nineteen new mem-
ber states, most of them from central and eastern Europe. These devel-
opments were decisive for the ongoing discussion within the Council
of Europe concerning a reform of the supervisory mechanism. 
Since 1982, several proposals had been forwarded concerning the
possibility of “merging” the European Commission on Human Rights
(Commission) and the Court into a single body. Apart from the idea of
“merging”, in 1990 there was a Dutch-Swedish initiative proposing
that the opinions of the Commission under Article 31 (old)—in so far
as individual applications were concerned—would be transformed into
legally binding decisions. This led to a two-tier judicial system where
the Commission would operate as a court of first instance from which
individual applicants and states could be granted a right of appeal to
the Court. However, no consensus was reached on this proposal. 
Seeking a clear mandate for reform, different proposals were sent
to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which
adopted Protocol No. 11 to the European Convention on Human
Rights in 1994. This entered into force on November 1, 1998.
The main feature of Protocol No. 11 was that a new single per-
manent Court in Strasbourg, France, replaced the two existing super-
visory organs, namely the European Commission on Human Rights
and the European Court of Human Rights. This permanent Court
was to perform the functions previously carried out by these organs.
This meant that the Court would now take decisions on admissibility
and attempt to bring the parties to a friendly settlement. All these
functions were previously performed by the Commission, the Court,
and the Committee of Ministers. 
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the new Court became
mandatory. Since the right of individual petition also became
mandatory the number of potential applicants, if calculated by ref-
erence to the population of the contracting states, grew from 451
million to 772 million. 
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One of the great advantages of the reform to the controlling
mechanism under the Convention is undoubtedly the direct access of
the individual to the Court. The Committee of Ministers only
retained its competence to supervise the implementation of the judge-
ments of the Court, while its former competence to deal with individ-
ual applications declared admissible but not referred to the Court was
abolished. The Committee’s competence with respect to inter-state
complaints remained unchanged. Since no transitional period was
foreseen for the old Court, the new Court received all the cases that
could not be completed by the old Court as a “dowry” on the date of
entry into force of Protocol No. 11. 
During the three years that followed the entry into force of
Protocol No. 11, the Court’s caseload grew at an unprecedented rate.
The number of registered applications rose from 5,979 in 1998 to
13,858 in 2001, an increase of approximately 130 percent. Since
1993, the number of applications grew by over 500 percent. This is
not solely the consequence of the accession of new member states,
since individuals in older member states also increasingly turn to the
Court. The system is seriously overloaded and, with the relatively lim-
ited resources available to it, the Court’s ability to respond is in dan-
ger. It may also be observed that, when the reform leading to Protocol
No. 11 was first conceived, this substantial and rapid enlargement of
the Council of Europe and the impact it would have on the control
machinery was not anticipated. Neither was it anticipated that a great
number of cases concerning the same violations in relation to the same
member state would be received. 
It is quite an understatement to say that there is an imbalance
between the input and output in Strasbourg. Since the new Court
commenced, its activities have significantly increased. In 2003, the
Court delivered 844 judgments. However, just under 39,000 applica-
tions are currently pending. Roughly 50 percent of the applications
are disposed of by the Court within one year of registration, but a con-
siderable number are not terminated within the 3-year target. Some
cases are not disposed of until after a period of four to six years (for
example, about 514 of the 4,719 applications registered in 1997). The
foreseeable development of cases from the perspective of execution of
judgments is also dramatic. There is every reason to suppose that the
predicted increase in the Court’s caseload will lead to a significant
increase in the number of judgments sent to the Committee of
Ministers for supervision of their execution.
PROCESS AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
IT SEEMS THAT THE CONCERN ABOUT THE COURT’S CAPACITY to
deal with the growing volume of cases has brought attention only to
the Court system and not to the system of human rights protection as
a whole, leading to proposals for change. In October 2002, the
Committee of Ministers’ Steering Committee for Human Rights
(CDDH) issued a report setting out its interim conclusions on the
proposals for reform. Among other things, the CDDH agreed to fur-
ther consider whether to grant the Court the power to decline to
examine applications that raise “no substantial issue” the European
Convention. It also considered ways to filter applications without cre-
ating a separate division within the Court and how to handle repeti-
tive cases. At its 112th Ministerial Session on May 14-15, 2003, the
Committee of Ministers adopted the Declaration, “Guaranteeing the
long-term effectiveness of the European Court of Human Rights,”
welcoming the final report (CM(2003)55) of the CDDH containing
a set of concrete proposals in this regard. The final stage of the
CDDH’s work will end in April 2004 with the adoption of the Final
Activity Report. 
Undoubtedly, the strength and effectiveness of the European sys-
tem of the protection of human rights lies in the right to individual
petition. It is this direct access of the individual to an international
organ competent to examine his/her complaint of a violation of one of
the rights and freedoms recognized in the European Convention that
has so far ensured a progressive development in the protection of fun-
damental rights within the domestic systems of the member states.
This is certainly envisaged in the most recent situation within Turkey.
If one considers the applications brought by individuals and the out-
come of those applications, not only on an individual basis but also
with regards to the effect of such decisions on the protection of fun-
damental rights within Turkey for all and not only for individual
applicants, one cannot but conclude that this has produced a change
towards better ensuring and affording that protection even on a
domestic level. Due to the importance and effect of the right of indi-
vidual petition, not only for the applicant but also for the domestic
position, it would be a great pity if the European system changed in
such a way so as to undermine or restrict the greater benefits of direct
access of the individual to the Court simply to do away with the back-
log that has been created. 
On the contrary, proposals strengthening the possibilities for
protection of the individual should be welcomed. For this reason, the
proposal put forward by the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for
Human Rights should be considered to allow the possibility to lodge
an application with the Court against one or more states parties in a
case which raises a serious issue of a general nature. Additionally, the
proposal to give the Commissioner the option to intervene as a third
party in pending proceedings should be favorably considered.
According to Article 38 of the Convention, the President of the Court
may, in the interest of the proper administration of justice, invite any
high contracting party which is not a party to the proceedings or any
person concerned who is not the applicant to submit written com-
ments or take part in hearings. As a third party, the Commissioner
could give his opinion on the case at stake and also could be heard as
an expert during the procedure.
A change in the system to ensure that applications are examined
efficiently and effectively requires a thorough examination not only of
the functioning of the Court but also of the functioning of the mem-
ber states, the Committee of Ministers, and other mechanisms within
the Council of Europe who, after all, share the same aim of ensuring
protection of fundamental rights. It is incorrect to review the
European system simply by reviewing the work of the Court since the
European system is not made up solely of the Court. The Court was
set up to be a measure of last resort, to be used only when all other
measures have been exhausted and failed. The fact that the applica-
tions have increased multifold before the court only goes to show that
these other mechanisms are failing. The European system was built on
a “collaboration” system for the protection of human rights within
which the member states and the Committee of Ministers were partic-
ipants together with the Court. 
Considering the existing admissibility criteria of the exhaustion
of domestic remedies, the ever increasing number of applications that
are found admissible, and for which judgment is given in favor of the
applicant even though that applicant has already exhausted domestic
remedies, can simply mean one thing - that those domestic remedies
are not functioning well. This could be for a variety of reasons such as
a lack of effective remedies that are made available to the individual,
or, where they are made available, a lack of proper implementation
and interpretation by the domestic courts, or even a lack of judicial
activism on the part of the domestic courts. 
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In this regard, the recommendations that are being proposed by
the Committee of Ministers and that are to be circulated to the mem-
ber states may help in this regard. Such recommendations, which will
deal with measures to be taken at the national level to improve domes-
tic remedies, verify the compatibility of laws with the European
Convention, and spread education on the Convention. However, they
will be fruitless if they remain as simple recommendations and are not
backed by a strong will to bring them into effect.
Considering the position in relation to the implementation of
the judgments delivered by the Court, and the time taken by the
member states to implement such judgments, one cannot but ques-
tion the obligation of the Committee of Ministers in this respect. The
implementation of such judgments not only seems to take time but
also seems to create an effect towards the applicant alone, even if the
domestic reality shows that several others have or are suffering the
same violation. In seeking to strengthen the effective implementation
of judgments, the CDDH has considered a proposal enabling the
Committee of Ministers to institute proceedings before the Grand
Chamber to seek a finding by the Court that the state has infringed its
obligation under Article 46(1) of the Convention, where a state per-
sistently refuses to comply with a judgment. But would this proposal
bring about anything that does not already exist? Or would it simply
shift more work onto the Court from the Committee of Ministers?
After all, once the Court has already delivered a judgment against a
member state, then that state has already been found to be in violation
of the Convention and, from then on, it is completely within the pow-
ers of the Committee of Ministers to ensure its implementation.
Obtaining another declaration from the Court will not attain any-
thing other than increase the caseload of the Court unnecessarily when
the Committee already possesses the means to ensure that a member
state complies with its obligations.
The better implementation of the court’s judgments by the
Committee of Ministers and a stronger political will on the part of the
Committee of Ministers to redress a situation which is evidently viola-
tive in respect to several persons within the jurisdiction of one of the
member states would certainly positively effect the situation created by
the Turkish and Russian applications. To a certain extent these appli-
cations stalled the Court’s work in relation to several other applica-
tions presented by individuals from other member states. The majori-
ty of the Turkish and Russian applications and the Russian cases main-
ly deal with serious violations of the Convention (right to life, torture,
inhuman treatment, questions of state responsibility). These cases will
take a lot of the Court’s time because of examination on the spot and
the hearing of witnesses is very time consuming.
Should these obligations be considered more in depth and imple-
mented more effectively, the several number of applications presented
to the Court should decrease in the case of individuals seeking redress
from the Court only when domestic measures have failed. To this
extent, the failure of the system established under Protocol 11 does
not lie in the system nor in the increasing number of member states.
INTRODUCING A FILTERING MECHANISM
TWO OF THE MAIN PROPOSALS CONSIDERED BY THE CDDH in
its Interim Activity Report of November 26, 2003 will be considered
here in some detail since it is felt that they directly affect the individ-
ual’s direct access to the Court. 
First, the CDDH was convinced of the usefulness of reinforcing
the filtering capacity of the Court. It considered that the new figures
presented to it on the number of cases currently pending before a
Chamber (as of October 1, 2003, there were some 15,300 pending
Chamber cases) clearly demonstrated that a serious problem exists and
confirmed the need to find satisfactory solutions not only to alleviate
the workload of the registry but also that of the judges, considering
that the work carried out on filtering by the judges has already had a
negative impact on their capacity to deal with Chamber cases.
In this regard, the CDDH considered two variants. The first
requires that elected judges will be assisted by “assessors” (a term that
could be replaced, for example, by that of “advisers-rapporteurs”), it
being understood that, in all cases, only elected judges would be
empowered to make decisions. This would lead to a new composition
requiring one elected judge and two “assessors” with the competence
to filter applications given to the elected judge who is to examine all
applications after considering a report prepared by one of the two
“assessors.” Following this examination, the elected judge could
decide, on his or her own, that the application is inadmissible or trans-
mit it to a Committee or Chamber. 
The second variant considered puts such competence only upon
the “single judge” in the text of the Convention, thereby leaving it up
to the Court and the Registry to settle the details of the assistance to
be provided to that judge. The CDDH agreed to the creation of a fil-
tering mechanism on condition that it fully retain the judicial charac-
ter of the Court, thereby agreeing to the principle according to which
inadmissibility decisions would be taken by a single judge who is not
to be the “national” judge of the state concerned. The CDDH also
agreed that the single judge should be granted assistance in this func-
tion, without expressing at this stage a preference between a system of
“assessors” expressly mentioned in the Convention or assistance that
would be provided by the Registry of the Court.
In this proposal, the Court will have a separate filtering mecha-
nism operated by a different group of judges. Commenting on this
mechanism, Paul Mahoney, the Registrar of the Court, stated that this
filtering process “must be based on simple, clear, easily applied rules” so
as to provide assurance of objective treatment to the thousands of disap-
pointed applicants. He rightly points out that if the filtering procedure
is to exercise discretion in light of the particular circumstances, the basic
aims of a mass filtering are no longer met. However, one asks, which are
those clear, easily applied rules? We would not be able to think of any
other than those which are mentioned in Article 35 of the Convention.
Clearly the aim of the proposed changes is to decrease the num-
ber of applications that have to be considered in depth; but when one
is speaking of violations of fundamental rights, which cases are to be
filtered out? According to Mahoney, only a little more than 20 percent
of the 844 judgments delivered by the Court in the year 2003 con-
cerned substantial or new issues under the Convention. The proposal
of the CDDH is, in his opinion, too limited in its effect. In his point
of view, the Court is not set up for adjudicating every alleged interfer-
ence with a guaranteed right in the Convention country and then
awarding carefully assessed relief for every single instance of violation
shown to exist, whether or not the case involves what one might call a
wider public-policy issue of human rights protection in Europe. This
is, in our opinion, a rather formalistic approach of the existing prob-
lem which diminishes the importance of the individual that the sys-
tem seeks to protect in the first place. In his approach, Mahoney does
not take into account one basic fact—that the applications considered
by the Court and judged in favor of the individual are all cases where-
by the domestic remedy has failed. 
In view of this, the threshold for bringing a case to the Court
could only be made higher if every citizen of the contracting parties
would be able to find an effective and real remedy against an alleged
violation of the Convention at the domestic level. In this respect, the
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Court is not so much the victim of too many applicants but a victim
of a general reluctance of the member states to take the European
Convention seriously. The Strasbourg Court should only be used as an
ultimum remedium, but this can only be true if all other remedies and
mechanisms are effectively implemented and if the parties concerned
adhere to their obligations.
In its response to the Interim Report of the CDDH on February
2, 2004, the Court stated that “As to the filtering proposals currently
on the table, in so far as no immediate or future delegation of deci-
sion-making authority for the initial screening out of obviously inad-
missible cases is provided for, they do not correspond to the Court’s
view of what will in the longer term be necessary to keep the system
afloat.” The Court unequivocally maintained its position that, ulti-
mately, a separate filtering body will be required. Whatever the out-
come of this proposal may be, to us it seems that a part of this work is
almost identical to the work formerly entrusted to the European
Commission of Human Rights.
INTRODUCING NEW ADMISSIBILITY CRITERIA
APART FROM THE FILTERING PROCESS, the CDDH was also
instructed to pursue work on the proposal to introduce a new admis-
sibility requirement. Since there was no agreement between the dele-
gates on the text of this amendment, the CDDH has tried to find a
new formulation that would reinforce the principle of subsidiary. It
began by examining a new proposal made by the Austrian delegation
proposing an amendment to Article 35(3) of the Convention. The
proposal suggested the following amendment: 
The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual
application submitted under Article 34 [Proposal 1(b)]
if the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvan-
tage, unless respect for human rights as defined in the
Convention and the protocols thereto requires an exam-
ination of the application on the merits and provided
that no case may be rejected on this ground which has
not been considered by a domestic tribunal applying the
Convention and its case law; [Proposal 2(b)] if the appli-
cant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, notably
in view of the examination of the case by the national
authorities, unless the Court considers that respect for
human rights as defined in the Convention and the pro-
tocols thereto requires that the application be examined
on the merits.
If adopted, this proposal would mean that the Court would no
longer issue rulings on all cases that meet the current admissibility cri-
teria. Instead, the Court would only rule on cases that raise “substan-
tive” issues under the European Convention. Individuals whose com-
plaints the Court considers raise “no substantive issue” would not be
able to get a ruling by the Court about whether their Convention rights
have been violated, even if the case falls within the current admissibili-
ty criteria. Both proposals seem to suggest an even further limitation in
that both require the individual to have suffered “a significant disad-
vantage.” What this element will require is rather obscure, seeming to
distinguish between the severity of violations and their redress at a time
when it was thought to have been accepted that each and every viola-
tion of a right is to be equally condemned. The phrasing of proposal 2,
“notably in view of the examination of the case by the national authori-
ties,” indicates that the CDDH might be of the opinion that it could
make a difference for admission purposes if the applicant’s case had
received appropriate attention at the domestic level.
This would certainly mark a radical departure from the current
system in which the individual is the center of attention. The ration-
ale behind this proposal is clear. It offers the Court the possibility to
get rid of repetitive cases, such as the routine application of existing
case law, which deals exclusively with the unreasonable length of pro-
ceedings. But should such advantage for the caseload of the Court be
considered if it is clearly to the detriment of the individual? From the
individual’s point of view, he/she who has an arguable claim for which
redress is seemingly not offered at the domestic level is left only with
a complaint at the international level. Is this redress now to be taken
away simply to solve a backlog of cases? 
Do we need an extra admissibility requirement? From the formu-
lation of Article 35(2)(b) of the Convention, it might be inferred that
the words “substantially the same matter” also cover an application that
is otherwise identical but is lodged by another applicant. The provision
is, however, to be interpreted in the sense that it is only directed against
identical applications by the same applicant. It would not be in con-
formity with the purpose of the Convention to provide individual legal
protection if an application from X, who considers himself to be the
victim of a violation of the Convention, would not be admitted on the
grounds that an identical violation in relation to applicant Y is already
being examined or has already been examined. Before taking such a
drastic step of rejecting applications which fulfil the admissibility
requirements, other measures should be explored. A system should be
developed to force the states parties to abide by the judgements of the
Court and to ensure the execution of the judgements. 
The Court, in its response to the Interim Report, stated that it is
sympathetic to the wish to reinforce the principle of subsidiary and to
adapt any new admissibility condition accordingly. However, the
majority of the Court has preferred to propose introducing Article 37
criterion, which allows the Court to strike a case out of the list of cases
in situations where: (a) the applicant does not intend to pursue his
application; or (b) the matter has been resolved; or (c) for any other
reason established by the Court, it is no longer justified to continue
the examination of the application. However, the Court shall contin-
ue the examination of the application if respect for human rights as
defined in the Convention and the protocols thereto so requires.
If those concepts are incorporated into Article 35(3), the pro-
posed text could read as follows (proposals in bold):
The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual
application submitted under Article 34 where it consid-
ers that the application is incompatible with the provi-
sions of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, or
that respect for human rights as defined in the
Convention and the Protocols thereto does not require
the examination of the application, or that the applica-
tion is manifestly ill-founded or an abuse of the right of
application.
According to the Court, this represents a concept which, in the
majority’s opinion, is workable from a legal point of view once its
parameters have been clearly defined. In any event, this criterion, per-
haps unlike the “significant-disadvantage” test, would make it possible
for the Court to hold states accountable in all circumstances for failing
to fulfil their basic human rights obligations under the Convention and
its Protocols and, notably, where there is no domestic remedy.
CONCLUSION
THE LAST TEN YEARS OF THE DEVELOPMENT of the European
Court of Human Rights is a very cumbersome picture with respect to
35
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Because access to abortion is an important component of
healthcare and family planning, Russia should defer to CEDAW.
CEDAW fully articulates women’s rights to access healthcare and
family planning services. Although the CRC also addresses the rights
of mothers to prenatal and postnatal care, CEDAW is the interna-
tional authority on this area of law. Moreover, both CEDAW and the
CRC contain provisions that say they should not conflict with any
other international law or national law that is more conducive to real-
izing the rights that the treaty seeks to embody. For Russia to follow
the CRC in good faith it must look to CEDAW for all obligations
related to family planning and women’s access to healthcare. Finally,
the legislative history to the CRC shows that the Preamble clause on
which Russia has based its interpretation was meant to be subject to
other treaties governing the same subject matter. The clause was pur-
posefully silent on abortion. Hence, CEDAW is the ruling authority
on women’s right to abortion.
Russia’s interpretation of the CRC is not consistent with the spir-
it of either convention. The goal of both conventions is to provide for
the rights and health of women and children, and Russia’s plan under-
mines its ability to provide for these. By narrowly focusing on restrict-
ing access to abortion, Russia burdens the health and economic wel-
fare of women and families through unwanted pregnancies and dan-
gerous botched abortions. At the same time, Russia has neglected to
provide adequate access to and education on pregnancy prevention or
welfare resources to support the new children. 
CONCLUSION
RESTRICTING ACCESS TO ABORTION ALONE will not decrease heavy
reliance on abortion in Russia. Russian women have relied on abortions
for years and will continue to do so whether they are legal or not. Instead,
Russia must focus on providing full access to affordable and reliable con-
traception and reproductive health education. The CRC Committee’s
1999 Concluding Observations on Russia stress similar goals, recom-
mending that Russia ensure the effectiveness of measures taken to edu-
cate adolescents on contraception and STDs, strengthen reproductive
health and family planning services, and take further steps to prevent
teenage pregnancy and abortion. Moreover, as a country with a skyrock-
eting HIV/AIDS rate (the Commonwealth of Independent States has the
fastest-growing HIV/AIDS rate in the world), it is imperative that Russia
focus on health education and develop prevention and access networks.
With greater power, voice, and freedom, women would likely find
ways to control their reproductive health without relying on such inva-
sive procedures as abortion. Russia must take action to provide women
with greater control over their education, their sexual health and their
family lives. In order to reduce reliance on abortion, women need the
education and ability to plan their families in a reliable and noninva-
sive way. It is likely that the transition away from abortion to modern
forms of contraception will be long and complicated. The Abortion
Decree and Family Code Amendment, which offer no accompanying
legislation to provide additional family planning resources, will only
make this process more difficult and painful. HRB
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the workload and the duration of the time necessary to finally decide
cases. However, now it seems that the proposed reform of the existing
system would leave claimants whose applications are rejected on the
above considered basis without a remedy at all. Then, where and who
will offer that lost remedy? If the Court decides to examine the merits
of a case and finds a violation, it may decide under Article 41 of the
Convention that the respondent state should pay just satisfaction to
the victim of the violation. Under the new proposals, that possibility
would no longer exist when the Court decides to reject a case, notwith-
standing the fact that the applicant has fulfilled the current admissibil-
ity requirements. 
In the introduction of our contribution we opened with the
statements made by the president of the European Court of Human
Rights. Let us conclude with a statement made by Judge Antônio
Augusto Cançado Trindade, President of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, at the hearing of the European Court of Human
Rights on the occasion of the opening of the 2004 judicial year in
Strasbourg on January 22:
At procedural law level, one of the basic issues dwelt
upon by both Courts has been precisely that of the access
to justice at [the] international level, achieved under the
two Conventions by means of the operation of the
respective provisions on the international jurisdiction of
the two Human Rights Courts and on the right of indi-
vidual petition. I regard those provisions of such a fun-
damental character—as true fundamental clauses
(cláusulas pétreas) of the international protection of
human rights—that any attempt to undermine them
would threaten the functioning of the whole mechanism
of protection under the two regional Conventions. They
constitute the basic pillars of the mechanism whereby
the emancipation of the individual vis-à-vis his own
State is achieved. This outlook grows in importance for
having come at a time when the establishment of a new
international human rights Tribunal (an African Court
on Human and Peoples’ Rights) under the 1998
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights appears forthcoming.
We cannot do more than strongly underline this firm statement,
which does justice to those who are seeking justice, those who were
disregarded or disappointed at the domestic level and those who have
placed their hope in seeking justice at an international level. A propos-
al made by Mahoney for the introduction of a pilot-judgment for deal-
ing with situations generating repetitive cases is worth considering.
Under this proposal, the Court would take up a test case and suspend
the examination of all similar applications. If a violation of a structur-
al or organizational nature is found, the respondent state would be
obliged, in order to execute the judgment, not only to eliminate the
source of the violation for the future but also to make available a
retroactive national remedy to provide appropriate relief for other vic-
tims of the violation, including in particular persons who had lodged
an application with the Court in Strasbourg. 
This proposal should be explored further because it offers the
original victim a measure of redress while, at the same time, it creates
a structure that will not overload the European Court of Human
Rights with applications that deal with the same issue often in relation
to the same member state. It is proposals for change that do not restrict
the right to individual petition that may lead to the final conclusion
that the European Court of Human Rights will be a success story in
the next ten years and thereafter, since it is this very element of the
European system that has made it successful and that has inspired
hope for the weakest - the individual. HRB
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